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 Philosophers and psychologists often distinguish episodic or personal mem-
ory from propositional or semantic memory. A vexed issue concerns the role, 
if any, of memory “impressions” or “seemings” within the latter. According 
to an important family of approaches, seemings play a fundamental episte-
mological role vis-à-vis propositional memory judgments: it is one’s memory 
seeming that Caesar was murdered, say, that justifi es one’s judgment that he 
was murdered. 1 Yet, it has been convincingly argued that these approaches 
lead to insurmountable problems and that memory seemings are not well-
suited to play this justifying role. As a result, many contemporary accounts 
of propositional memory dispense with these seemings altogether. Is the idea 
that memory seemings play a key role in propositional memory really the 
result of bad theorizing? My aim is to shed light on this issue, which I will 
approach as follows. 
 In Section 1, I contrast episodic memory with propositional memory so 
as to clarify the nature of the latter. According to the account I put forward, 
episodic memory consists in the preservation of acquaintance with objects 
and events, whereas propositional memory consists in the preservation of 
thought contents. In Section 2, I turn my attention to the contrast between 
propositional memory contents and propositional memory as an attitude. 
I argue that they play different roles. Memory contents satisfy a past aware-
ness constraint and a causal constraint; the attitude of remembering ex-
plains why we are inclined to endorse these contents. This distinction leads 
me to explore the attitude of remembering, and I argue, in Section 3, that 
the most appealing account of this attitude is in terms of feelings of famil-
iarity. In Section 4, I turn my attention to the epistemology of propositional 
memory and revisit the claim that propositional memory judgments are 
justifi ed by memory seemings. In so doing, I contend that the attitude of 
remembering plays an exclusively explanatory role and does not contrib-
ute to the epistemology of propositional memory judgments. I conclude by 
drawing a more general lesson regarding the respective roles of attitudes 
and contents. 
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 1 Memory: Propositional vs. Episodic 
 Let me start by introducing the sort of phenomena that fall under the label 
of “propositional memory.” I shall do so by contrasting these phenomena 
with what happens when we remember episodically. 
 We often attribute memories to people with the help of the verb “to re-
member” followed by nominal constructions, as when we say, “Mary re-
members her fi rst encounter with her mother-in-law,” or “John remembers 
the fi rst movements of the symphony.” We thereby imply (among other 
things) that Mary and John have been acquainted with the events and ob-
jects they remember. This is sometimes called “personal” and sometimes 
“episodic” memory. 2 
 What happens when we remember episodically? First, we must have been 
acquainted with the objects or events that are remembered, where the past 
acquaintance is typically perceptual—for instance, Mary saw her mother-
in-law. Second, this past acquaintance informs our memory of these objects 
or events. Episodic memory is phenomenologically rich: it is, for Mary, “as 
if” she was seeing her mother-in-law and, for John, “as if” he was hearing 
the overture of the symphony. That is to say, memory here consists in a pre-
served acquaintance or cognitive contact ( Byrne, 2010 ;  Martin, 2001 ). What 
I shall call  memory images make one aware of the relevant events or objects. 3
 By contrast, propositional memory is typically (but, of course, not only) 
manifested in one’s knowledge of historical and mathematical facts. 4 When 
Sam remembers that Caesar was murdered, or Mary remembers that the 
square root of 625 is 25, we face cases of propositional memory. In a nut-
shell, propositional memory consists in the preservation of propositional 
contents. Thanks to this kind of memory, propositional contents that we 
have judged or merely entertained remain available for thought and are 
typically accepted or endorsed at later times. 5 If this is what propositional 
memory amounts to, then it no doubt differs from episodic memory. In par-
ticular, propositional memory does not involve memory images. Consider 
Sam, who has preserved the content that Caesar was murdered and is dis-
posed to endorse it. First, Sam is plainly not in a position to enjoy a memory 
image that would make him aware of Caesar’s murder. After all, he has not 
been acquainted with this event—perceptually or otherwise—and so cannot 
have a preserved acquaintance with it in the form of a memory image ( Mc-
Grath, 2007 ;  Teroni, 2017 ). 6 Second, while propositional memory arguably 
always traces back to a past learning event, it does not presuppose episodic 
memory of this event. Actually, it does not even presuppose that one has 
preserved any information about it. For instance, Sam may remember that 
Caesar was murdered while having no inkling as to how he acquired this 
information, let alone be in a position to re-live, say, the relevant classroom 
experience. Third, the idea that propositional memory involves memory im-
ages would be hard to make sense of in many cases, as in the case of Mary 
who remembers that the square root of 625 is 25. 
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 I hope the foregoing is enough to capture the very familiar phenomena that 
I describe as propositional memory. In what follows, I shall be exclusively 
concerned with this kind of memory. 
 2 Propositional Memory: Content vs. Attitude 
 I will start exploring propositional memory with the help of the important, 
yet surprisingly often overlooked, distinction between  memory contents and 
memory as a mode or an attitude ( Locke, 1971 , chap. 1;  Matthen, 2010 ). 7 
 To explain what is at stake, let me start by noting that two distinct 
features of a psychological state may lead one to describe it as a memory. 
One may describe a psychological state as a memory fi rst because its  content
satisfi es some constraints. Recent discussions of propositional memory have 
almost exclusively focused on the specifi cation of these constraints. Given 
my aim here, I suggest that we adopt the following rough characterization 
of propositional memory contents: a propositional content  p is a memory 
content for S if and only if (i) it was the content of a past representation of S 
that  p , and (ii) its occurrence in S is caused by this past representation. 8 The 
content that Caesar was murdered is a memory content for Sam in virtue 
of (i) Sam having previously judged that Caesar was murdered, and (ii) this 
content being actually available to Sam because he judged so. 9 A content 
may thus fail to qualify as a memory content because the subject was not 
previously aware of it, or because, despite having been aware of it, his past 
awareness does not explain the actual availability of that content. 10 
 Observe now that the contrast between memory contents and other sorts 
of contents holds independently of the subject’s inclination to judge memory 
contents to be true. On the one hand, someone may entertain a memory 
content without being inclined to endorse it—the fact that a content satisfi es 
the previous constraints does not imply that there is an inclination to judge 
it true. In retrospect, we typically characterize the situation in which a 
memory content does not go together with such an inclination by saying 
that we did not realize, at the time, that we were remembering. On the other 
hand, we may also be inclined to endorse a content that fails to qualify as 
a memory content, either because we erroneously believe that it does so 
qualify, or because we have other reasons for endorsing it. 
 Let me now turn to the second feature of a psychological state that may 
lead one to describe it as a memory. This second feature is the specifi c 
attitude that the subject has toward a content. The fact that there is such 
a distinction between memory contents and the attitude of remembering is 
plain given that they can independently vary. The attitude of remembering 
sometimes targets contents that are not memory contents—in such cases, we 
often say that what we seem to remember is a fi gment of our imagination. 
Moreover, we have already acknowledged that this attitude may be absent 
when we entertain memory contents. Memory content is one thing, the 
attitude of remembering another. 
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 How should we go about characterizing the attitude of remembering? 
Contrary to what I have just said regarding memory contents, we cannot 
dissociate the attitude of remembering from the subject’s inclination to 
endorse the content that it targets. As opposed to someone who  entertains
a content or  supposes that it is true, someone who  remembers the content 
is inclined to endorse it, and he will endorse it if he has no reason to doubt 
that it is true or that he has preserved it. As  Burge (1993 : 465) rightly 
observes, propositional memory (“purely preservative memory” in his 
terminology) preserves contents with judgmental force, i.e., we are inclined 
to endorse these contents when we remember. For that reason, an account 
of the attitude of remembering is an account of a tendency to endorse some 
contents, a tendency that explains the crucial role propositional memory 
plays in our cognition. Now, as this tendency is obviously not exclusive 
to the attitude of remembering, is it possible to say a bit more in order to 
clarify what we are after? 
 I shall attempt to do so by focusing fi rst on the correctness conditions 
of mental states in general and then by applying this idea to propositional 
memory. Consider the following psychological states: judging that  p , 
conjecturing that  p , and remembering that  p . These attitudes take the same 
content, which is why they share an important part of their correctness 
conditions. Yet, the fact that these are different attitudes has itself a distinct 
impact on their respective correctness conditions. 11 Roughly, it is because 
one  judges that the psychological state of judging that  p is correct if and 
only if the content is true; it is because one  conjectures that the state of 
conjecturing that  p is correct if and only if the content is probable ; and it is 
because one  remembers that the state of remembering that  p is correct if and 
only if that content was the content of a past representation that is causally 
responsible for its being now available. These differences in the correctness 
conditions trace back to the contribution of the different attitudes. 
 In light of these observations, we can conclude that the attitude of 
remembering plays an important explanatory role: it explains why we are 
inclined to endorse some contents out of a sensitivity to the fact that these 
contents are available to us because they have been previously represented. 
Our task in Section 3 is to examine what this attitude and sensitivity amount 
to. But let me fi rst wrap up this discussion of the contrast between memory 
contents and memory as an attitude. An account of memory contents should 
proceed in terms of a previous awareness constraint and a causal constraint. 
As opposed to this, an account of the attitude of remembering is an account 
of a distinctive tendency to endorse some contents. 
 3 Explanation: The Nature of the Attitude 
 This section revolves around the following issue. In propositional memory, 
we typically endorse whatever we remember. If Sam remembers that Caesar 
was murdered, then in all likelihood (and if he has no confl icting evidence), 
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he will endorse this as a fact. We have just concluded that this is a char-
acteristic of the attitude of remembering. Given that a central aspect of 
this attitude is a tendency to endorse the content it targets, how should we 
understand it? In what follows, I do not explore all the available options—I 
rather focus on two unpersuasive accounts before introducing my favorite 
one. 12 
 The fi rst account consists in regarding our inclination to endorse memory 
contents as a primitive and not further explainable trait of propositional 
memory, at least insofar as the fi rst-person level is concerned ( Goldman, 
1993a ). 13 This amounts to saying that, from the subject’s perspective, it is 
simply that she fi nds herself so inclined. No memory attitude that would help 
her to make sense of this inclination is available to her. Sensitivity to the fact 
that contents are available because they have been previously represented 
is a characteristic of subpersonal processes and is not made manifest at the 
fi rst-person level. 
 Now, this fl at denial of a fi rst-person level explanation as to why we are 
typically inclined to endorse memory contents should come as a surprise. 
This is because there appears to be a clear difference between two distinct 
cases. You can be aware that you are simply inclined to endorse a content. 
Alternatively, you can be aware that you are so inclined because, as we 
often say, you  seem to remember (e.g.,  Cullison, 2010 ). In the latter case, 
reference to remembering appears to be explanatory of the inclination to 
endorse the content, but the fi rst account fails to acknowledge this. 14 I do 
not mean to suggest that we should always look for a fi rst-person level 
explanation of the inclination to endorse memory contents. The suggestion 
is more modest: typically, memory makes itself manifest at the fi rst-person 
level as the source of the inclination to endorse a content. 15 This is why the 
fi rst account is not persuasive. 
 We often explain why we are inclined to endorse memory contents by 
saying that we seem to remember. Which explanation do we offer when 
we do so? To answer this question, let me say a few words about “look” 
constructions, which function in very similar ways as “seem to remember.” 
Look constructions, it is frequently observed, lend themselves to different 
readings ( Chisholm, 1957 , chap. 4;  Maund, 2003 , chap. 7). We can read “It 
looks as if it will rain” as expressing the belief that one has good reasons to 
think it will rain. This is the  epistemological reading. “I seem to remember 
that  p ” is read epistemologically when it is read as expressing my belief that 
I have good reasons to think that a content is a memory content. In light of 
the rough characterization we use here, this is the belief that I did previously 
represent a content and that this past event explains why the content is now 
available to me. 16 
 The second account of the attitude of remembering recruits the 
epistemological reading of “seem to remember.” It claims that beliefs 
about contents explain our inclination to endorse memory contents. 
More precisely, the attitude of remembering is understood in terms of the 
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functional role that individuates memory contents: this attitude consists in 
the subject’s belief that a content he has in mind actually plays this role. 17
Sensitivity to the fact that contents have been previously represented is now 
a characteristic of the fi rst-person level, since it takes the shape of this belief. 
That being said, this account of the inclination to endorse memory contents 
is not very appealing for at least three reasons. 
 First, it rests on unconvincing psychological assumptions. We are surely 
prone to surmise that contents play a functional role when there is room for 
doubt and when alternative explanations for their availability are salient 
to us. To illustrate, suppose that Michelle tells her friend Sam that he 
sometimes makes up historical facts. He may then think about it, conclude 
that the content that Caesar was murdered is available to him because 
he learned it somewhere, and as a result endorse it. However, the claim 
that we should explain all memory judgments in this way is diffi cult to 
reconcile with their typical immediacy. Second, and in direct connection, the 
explanation is far too intellectualistic ( Goldman, 1993a ,  1993b ). Children 
make memory judgments well before they understand the nature of memory 
contents—grasping relations between thought contents across time is, after 
all, a substantial cognitive achievement. This provides the opportunity to 
come back to the claim put forward in Section 2, according to which past-
related correctness conditions in memory are the result of the attitude of 
remembering. One reason for this claim is that attitudes are at play well 
before subjects have the capacity to understand what they are. The account 
under discussion raises a worry precisely because it rejects this claim in 
identifying the attitude of remembering with complex beliefs. Third and 
fi nally, the explanation is circular. How can Sam believe that he previously 
judged that  p , if not by endorsing other propositional memory contents? For 
these reasons, beliefs about the functional role played by memory contents 
cannot explain the inclination to endorse them that is characteristic of 
remembering. To understand this attitude, we should look elsewhere. 
 To home in on the attitude of remembering, we have to come back to the 
“seem to remember” locution. Similar to “this looks red to me,” “I seem 
to remember” lends itself to a  phenomenological reading, as opposed to 
an epistemological one. Read this way, these expressions refer to specifi c 
experiences. “Looking red” refers to the distinctive visual experience that 
red surfaces elicit, and “seeming to remember” refers to an experience 
that is characteristic of propositional memory. Now, it is hardly deniable 
that experiences often accompany memory judgments—this is why so 
many philosophers have referred to impressions of remembering, memory 
impressions, or seemings (e.g.,  Audi, 1995 ;  Pollock, 1974 ;  Pollock & Cruz, 
1999 ;  Russell, 1921 ). The real issue is not the existence of these seemings, 
but their nature and their role(s) within propositional memory. 
 As regards their nature, I shall rest content with a few observations (see 
 Teroni, 2017 ). First, it is important to emphasize that  memory seemings
differ from the  memory images distinctive of episodic memory. Memory 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   334 08-02-2018   23:20:28
On Seeming to Remember 335
seemings do not constitute a retained acquaintance with the relevant objects 
or events, and they are phenomenologically much poorer than memory 
images. Seeming to remember that Caesar was murdered is not being in 
a state akin to seeing his murder. More specifi cally, these seemings do 
not vary as a function of what is retrieved. They do no more than tag the 
content as being a memory, and they differ from one another only insofar 
as they are more or less intense. 18 Second, among the many approaches to 
these seemings, a quite appealing one claims that they consist in feelings 
of familiarity. In the phenomenological sense, to “seem to remember” a 
content is for it to feel familiar. 19 In the present context, this means that 
propositional memory contents typically feel familiar, which is why we are 
inclined to endorse them. This is what the subject’s sensitivity to the fact that 
contents have been previously represented amounts to, and it is squarely 
located at the fi rst-person level. But we now explain the inclination to accept 
memory contents in a way that is not too intellectualistic and is faithful to 
the fact that we typically endorse memory contents immediately, not as a 
result of reasoning. An additional virtue of an account in terms of feelings 
of familiarity is that it explains typical mistakes of self-attribution, which 
are due to illusions of familiarity. This makes for an attractive account of 
the attitude of remembering. 20 
 Now that we have a clearer picture of the attitude of remembering, let me 
emphasize an important consequence of our having carefully kept content 
and attitude apart. The attitude of remembering need not accompany 
memory contents, which may in addition be endorsed for a variety of reasons. 
But observe that we are in a position to say that, when the inclination to 
endorse these contents is explained by a feeling of familiarity, the attitude 
of remembering plays a distinctive fi rst-person level explanatory role. It is 
only when feelings of familiarity come about that we endorse these contents 
because we (seem to) remember. 21 
 Let me conclude this section. The best explanation of why we are 
typically inclined to endorse memory contents proceeds in terms of feelings 
of familiarity that characterize the attitude of remembering. The next 
issue regards the epistemological consequences of the explanatory role 
characteristic of this attitude. 
 4 Justifi cation: Content vs. Attitude 
 In the previous section, we recruited memory seemings to explain why we 
are typically inclined to endorse memory contents. I now turn my attention 
to a key epistemological issue regarding propositional memory. Do memory 
seemings justify the judgments we make when we remember? I will explore 
this issue by examining a widespread approach about propositional memory 
that gives a positive answer to this question. 
 According to this approach, there is a distinctive justifi cation in 
propositional memory: the memory seemings that typically explain why 
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we judge also justify our endorsing the contents we happen to retrieve. 22 If 
you seem to remember that Caesar was murdered, i.e., if that content feels 
familiar, then you are justifi ed in judging that he was murdered (e.g.,  Audi, 
1995 ;  Pollock, 1974 ;  Pollock & Cruz, 1999 ). At least, you are justifi ed if 
you are aware of no defeaters, which may have to do with information 
suggesting that the judgment is false or that you could not have learned the 
relevant fact. In this sense, the justifi cation provided by feelings of familiarity 
is defeasible or  prima facie . 
 Why is this approach popular? The following line of thought constitutes an 
important source of motivation. In many, if not most, cases of propositional 
memory, we have lost track of our reason(s) for having judged that  p in 
the fi rst place. Sam is likely to have forgotten why he came to judge that 
Caesar was murdered, for instance. Claiming that these memory judgments 
are unjustifi ed would therefore generate a substantial form of skepticism. 
Now, according to a widespread approach, whatever contributes to the 
justifi cation of a judgment must be accessible by the subject who makes 
that judgment—this is internalism about justifi cation ( Pappas, 2014 ). To the 
extent that one sides with internalism, a sensible move in the epistemology 
of propositional memory consists in avoiding skepticism by claiming that 
memory seemings—experiential states to which we have access when we 
retrieve contents—justify our endorsing these contents. 23 
 Accounting for the justifi cation of propositional memory judgments in 
terms of memory seemings should look quite convincing—indeed, it has 
convinced many philosophers. Yet, this account faces a serious worry in-
sofar as memory seemings turn out to be insuffi cient for the justifi cation 
of propositional memory judgments ( Annis, 1980 ;  Naylor, 1982 ). Suppose 
that Michael came to judge that Caesar died in his bed on the basis of fan-
ciful reasons. Years later, he entertains the thought that Caesar died in his 
bed, and it so happens that he seems to remember that this was the case 
and is aware of no defeater for that judgment. The account under discus-
sion would assess Michael’s memory judgment that Caesar died in his bed 
as justifi ed. This is a claim we have every reason to avoid: memory cannot 
function as a generative epistemological source in this way. 24 After all, it is 
because Michael judged on the basis of fanciful reasons that his judgment 
was unjustifi ed when he made it for the fi rst time. The fact that the content 
now feels familiar surely cannot turn this unjustifi ed judgment into a justi-
fi ed one. Yet, the account as it stands is committed to saying that the jus-
tifi cation of propositional memory judgments is completely divorced from 
past reasons to judge. This is inacceptable. In a slogan, “garbage in, garbage 
out” ( Jackson, 2011 ). 
 This parallels the more general conclusion reached by some philosophers 
regarding the justifi catory role of seemings: it is not seemings in general, but 
only some of them that justify. 25 In particular, if a seeming has a problematic 
aetiology, then it cannot justify a subject to endorse the content that seems 
true to him ( Bergman, 2013 ;  Jackson, 2011 ;  Markie, 2013 ). In propositional 
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memory, aetiology of course takes center stage, since the feeling of familiarity 
originates in a situation in which the subject has already judged for good 
or bad reasons. 26 This dependence of the seeming on a past situation in 
which the belief was acquired is what makes it unappealing to claim that 
endorsing a content because it feels familiar is suffi cient for justifi cation. 
Memory is not an independent source of justifi cation; it can only transmit it 
( McGrath, 2007 ;  Naylor, 1982 ;  Teroni, 2014 ). 27 Memory seemings do not 
generate a new type of justifi cation, an observation that chimes well with 
the fact that retaining and manifesting a belief is not a matter of basing it on 
new evidence. This conclusion can be strengthened if we remind ourselves 
of the nature of these seemings. Feelings of familiarity toward contents are 
reliably caused by the fact that these contents have been entertained. So, they 
may justify the judgment that they have been entertained. But they cannot 
justify our endorsing these contents: the fact that a content has already been 
entertained is hardly a reason to think it true. 
 Let me highlight three aspects of the conclusion we have reached so 
far, namely the conclusion that feelings of familiarity cannot justify our 
endorsing of the contents they target. First, this conclusion goes against 
something we may call “present-tense internalism,” i.e., the claim that all 
the factors relevant to the justifi cation of a judgment are accessible to the 
subject  at the time he makes that judgment ( Teroni, 2014 ). The conclusion 
is nevertheless compatible with more relaxed forms of internalism, for 
instance those according to which these factors must have been accessible 
at some point in the past (at the time the belief is acquired, for instance). 28 
 Second, the claim is limited to feelings of familiarity and is not meant 
to carry over to other experiences we may have when we remember. In 
Section 1, we distinguished episodic from propositional memory by saying 
that memory images are characteristic of the former but not of the latter. 
When we episodically remember, it is as if we were perceiving the relevant 
events or objects again. Nothing I have said here militates against the idea that 
memory images constitute an original form of justifi cation—we may have to 
adopt distinct accounts of propositional and episodic memory justifi cation 
(Teroni, 2014). More specifi cally, there is an important difference between 
propositional and episodic memory. When, and only when, we remember 
episodically, the truth-maker of the judgments we make is manifest to us. 
For instance, we judge that a friend wore a yellow dress at a party because 
we remember her wearing the dress. This may well have epistemological 
consequences ( Conee, 2013 ;  Hoerl, 2001 ;  Teroni, 2014 ). 
 Third, and most importantly, the conclusion that feelings of familiarity 
are not suffi cient for justifi cation leaves their exact epistemological role 
underspecifi ed. Here is how I think we should go about specifying that 
role. If we insist on aetiological issues in the epistemology of propositional 
memory, then the net result is that we are justifi ed in endorsing a memory 
content because it feels familiar only if we had good reasons to make the 
judgment in the fi rst place. 29 This is the extent of memory’s epistemological 
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dependence. Now, there are two options at this stage. One option is to say 
that the judgment we make when we remember is justifi ed  by the feeling of 
familiarity provided it has the right aetiology . This is tantamount to saying 
that the reasons we had to pass the judgment in the fi rst place—our past 
reasons, we may say—play no epistemological role when we remember. 
Alternatively, we may say that the judgment is justifi ed  by these past reasons . 
I think we should favor the second option. Here is why. 
 According to the fi rst option, feelings of familiarity play an epistemological 
role only when they are fi ltered by considerations that are typically 
outside of the subject’s ken when he remembers. If we concede this much, 
however, it is diffi cult to see why we should deny that past reasons play an 
epistemological role at the time of memory. Once we accept that endorsing 
a content is justifi ed (or not) as a function of the subject’s past reasons, why 
not wholeheartedly embrace the idea that preserving a justifi ed belief is not 
a matter of basing it on new evidence? Let me emphasize that the option 
under discussion should receive no support from the fact that feelings of 
familiarity play an explanatory role. In Section 3, we granted that these 
feelings explain our inclination to endorse the relevant contents. Memory 
seemings do make a psychological difference; they contribute to making the 
judgment intelligible from the subject’s perspective. This is why I insisted 
that we should distinguish a simple inclination to endorse a content from 
the inclination to endorse it because we seem to remember. The present issue 
is whether memory seemings additionally play an epistemological role. 30 
 Once explanatory and epistemological issues are distinguished, the claim 
that feelings of familiarity justify endorsing the contents they target is diffi cult 
to support. Suppose that Sam acquired the belief that Caesar was murdered 
because he attended a lecture on the Roman Empire with you ten years ago. 
Suppose, moreover, that he now makes this judgment because he did attend 
this lecture. I submit that, intuitively, his judgment is justifi ed—provided, 
of course, there are no defeaters. However, the absence of a feeling of 
familiarity is not one of these defeaters. If you come to learn that no feeling 
of familiarity accompanies Sam’s retrieving this content, you will not revise 
your assessment of his judgment. 31 So, judgments based on past reasons—
judgments made because one had these reasons—are justifi ed in the absence 
of feelings of familiarity. 32 This suggests that ascribing a justifi catory role 
to these feelings betrays a confusion between an explanation as to why we 
sometimes judge out of a sensitivity to what we have previously represented 
(which consists in a content’s feeling familiar) and what justifi es this 
judgment (the past reasons). In other words, to advocate the option under 
discussion is to confuse the  attitude of remembering —which only explains 
why we make memory judgments—and  constraints on contents that make 
them (justifi ed) memory contents—constraints that specify what happened 
at the time the belief was acquired, as well as the relation between what 
happened then and what is happening at the time of memory. 
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 These considerations motivate the second option distinguished previously, 
which is often described as the  past reasons theory ( Annis, 1980 ;  Bernecker, 
2010 ;  Naylor, 1982 ). According to this theory, insofar as past reasons have 
not been defeated in the meantime, they justify endorsing the same con-
tent at the time of memory. If Sam’s reason for judging that Caesar was 
murdered is that he hears a teacher say so, this reason—provided that, for 
example, Sam did not come across information suggesting that the teacher 
is a fraud—justifi es Sam’s memory judgment that Caesar was murdered. 33 
The past reasons theory avoids the worries attached to the claim that seem-
ing to remember a content justifi es endorsing that content. Of course, many 
refi nements would be required in order to develop a complete account of 
propositional memory justifi cation along the lines recommended by the past 
reasons theory. 34 These refi nements shall not concern me here. 
 What I want to emphasize is that the past reasons theory does not, in 
itself, explain why we make memory judgments. Past reasons for judging 
that  p may justify us in making the same judgment at a later time, but 
they do not explain why we are inclined to make that judgment when we 
remember. In light of the distinction between explanatory and justifi catory 
issues related to propositional memory, we can conclude that the past 
reasons theory should remain open to a variety of explanations as to why 
we make propositional memory judgments, and in particular to fi rst-person 
level explanations in terms of feelings of familiarity. 
 We have reached the following conclusion: given that feelings of 
familiarity do not justify, the most appealing approach to the justifi cation 
of propositional memory judgments is a version of the past reasons 
theory. With the help of this theory, we have dissociated the fi rst-person 
level explanation of why we make memory judgments (viz., because of a 
phenomenologically manifest attitude of remembering) from what justifi es 
these judgments (which relates to the aetiology of memory contents). 
 5 Conclusion: Generalizing the Lesson 
 I shall now bring together and generalize the conclusions of Section 4 
(feelings of familiarity explain why we endorse memory contents) and 
Section 5 (these feelings do not justify). These conclusions contain a more 
general lesson: having an attitude toward a given content is seldom a reason 
to endorse it. It is, I suggest, because feelings of familiarity characterize 
memory as an attitude that they are unfi t to justify the contents they target. 
Why is that so? 
 In general, the occurrence of an attitude does not carry any implication 
regarding whether we are justifi ed in endorsing the content of this attitude. 
Consider these cases. “Why do you think that  p is true?—Because I believe 
that  p .” “Why do you think that o is dangerous?—Because I am afraid of 
it.” “Why do you think that  p is true?—Because I seem to remember that  p .” 
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It is fair to say that reference to any of these attitudes is not a good answer 
to these epistemological questions. 
 I have illustrated the fact that attitudes need not justify the judgments to 
which they incline us with belief, fear, and remembering. These attitudes 
cannot justify the relevant judgments for the same reason. The reason is that 
believing, having an emotion and remembering are all based, albeit in dif-
ferent ways, on other psychological states. Believing may be based on other 
beliefs, on perception, or on introspection. To be afraid of a dog, one must 
be aware of it independently of one’s emotion, for instance by perceiving it 
(Deonna & Teroni, 2012). Fear would in that case be based on a perceptual 
experience. Similarly, someone who remembers a content must have pre-
viously thought it. Remembering is in this (different) sense based on past 
mental states. 
 This basing relation has the following consequence. In order to assess 
whether the judgments we make because we have these attitudes are justifi ed, 
we should turn our attention to the states on which they are based. Believing 
is obviously an inclination to endorse a content. But to assess whether 
endorsing that content is justifi ed, we should turn our attention to whatever 
the belief is based on. The judgment that the dog is dangerous, which one is 
inclined to make because one is afraid of it, is justifi ed only if the perceptual 
experience on which fear is based meets some constraints—for instance, if 
it represents the approach of a growling dog. Drawing attention to the fact 
that one’s fear is based on a perceptual experience with this content explains 
why one is justifi ed in judging that the dog is dangerous. In a parallel fashion, 
we should assess the justifi cation of the judgment we are inclined to make 
when we seem to remember as a function of the past mental state on which 
the memory is based. As this is typically a past judgment, the justifi cation of 
the memory judgment depends on the justifi cation of a past judgment, and 
so on one’s reasons to make it. 
 The attitudes of believing, fearing, and remembering do not justify the 
relevant judgments. Yet, if my argument has been successful, attitudes are 
still needed to explain our inclination to endorse the relevant contents. In 
the same way as one might not have been inclined to judge that the dog is 
dangerous if one had not been afraid of it, one might not have been inclined 
to judge that Caesar was murdered if one did not seem to remember that 
so was the case. These explanations can take many different shapes. In 
the case of the emotions, it seems safe to say that these explanations are 
located at the fi rst-person level. Emotions are phenomenologically salient, 
and we usually are in a position to know that we are inclined to make 
judgments because we emote. I have argued that the explanation of our 
tendency to endorse the contents that the attitude of remembering targets is 
of the same nature. Both of these explanations contrast with the explanation 
as to why we endorse the contents we believe, because believing is not a 
phenomenologically salient attitude. 
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 Notes 
 *  I am grateful to Sven Bernecker for his helpful comments on a previous version 
of this paper. 
 1  Here and in what follows, I use the term “judgment” where others prefer to talk 
of occurrent (as opposed to dispositional) belief. Let me emphasize that I do 
not think of a judgment as a mental activity that critically assesses the evidence 
for and against a given proposition. In the intended sense, judgments take place 
whenever we accept or endorse propositions and can be quite passive, as is the 
case for many perceptual and memory judgments, for instance. 
 2  The characterization of episodic memory I am about to offer will inevitably be 
controversial, given the various debates as to what it amounts to. I shall leave 
this mainly terminological issue aside in what follows. The only point I wish 
to emphasize is that there is a fundamental difference between the phenomena 
I describe as episodic memory and those I describe as propositional memory. 
Naylor (2011) discusses the intricacies facing the defi nition of episodic memory 
and defends a position that differs from the one sketched here. 
 3  Images have a bad press. Here and in what follows, I use the term “image” only 
to emphasize that remembering something resembles perceiving it. For discus-
sion, see Teroni (2017). 
 4  Given the way I have characterized episodic memory, one may remember that 
so-and-so happened in one’s own past without this qualifying as an instance 
of remembering episodically. In the following, I use examples of propositional 
remembering of historical facts, but my conclusions should hold for any case of 
propositional memory as I characterize it here. 
 5  These contents are only typically endorsed, since one can remember that  p with-
out judging that  p (e.g., when one has confl icting evidence). For a careful consid-
eration of these cases, see Bernecker (2010, chap. 3). 
 6  This does not mean that sensory imagery never accompanies propositional mem-
ory: it obviously sometimes does. This imagery is inessential, however, since 
it does not constitute one’s memory of the relevant events or objects. See e.g., 
Martin, 2015. 
 7  The pervasive use of the expression “propositional attitude” explains why 
I favor the latter term in the context of a discussion of propositional memory. 
 8  Three observations are in order. First, we should leave room for some variation 
between the content of the past representation and that of memory (e.g., Mat-
then, 2010) and relax the identity constraint I use here (see Bernecker, 2010, 
pp. 217–229 for a convincing account in terms of content entailment). Second, 
the causal requirement should avoid deviant causal chains. Third, there is the 
additional issue, which I leave aside here, of whether only true contents can 
qualify as memory contents. Acknowledging these issues entails that the char-
acterization I put forward should be signifi cantly refi ned, but I believe that this 
does not affect my current argument. 
 9  When I say that a content is a memory content “for the subject,” I do not mean 
that it is so “from his perspective.” I only mean that this content plays the rel-
evant role in his psychology. The satisfaction of the relevant constraints need not 
be transparent to the subject. Let me observe in addition that the past awareness 
constraint simply acknowledges what Campbell (1994) describes as the “stepwise 
character” of memory. To say that memory presupposes past awareness does not 
imply that the subject paid attention to this past awareness at the time it occurred. 
 10  Here and in what follows, I shall call the contents that satisfy these constraints 
“memory contents.” This should not be read as implying that these contents are 
exclusive to memory. 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   341 08-02-2018   23:20:30
342 Fabrice Teroni
 11  In favoring this approach to the contrast between content and attitude, I follow 
suggestions made, among others, by Crane (2003) and Recanati (2007). See also 
Matthen (2010) and Deonna and Teroni (2012, chap. 7). 
 12  I criticize some of these options from a slightly different perspective in Teroni 
(2014). 
 13  Goldman thinks, and I agree, that this is a consequence of classical variants of 
functionalism. Many advocates of the past reason theory, which we shall have 
the opportunity to discuss in Section 4, favor this explanation of our inclination 
to endorse propositional memory contents. 
 14  Confronted with the same dialectical situation with respect to perception, 
Campbell (1984) explains why understanding perception purely in terms of the 
making of non-inferential judgments is unpersuasive. He does so by drawing 
attention to the difference between a standard perceiver who judges as she does 
because of what she sees and a blind yet reliable seer who fi nds himself with 
exactly the same judgments popping in his mind. I wish to insist on the existence 
of a similar difference with respect to memory. 
 15  I agree here with Werner (2013) that only some dispositions to judge are 
explained by a specifi c phenomenology. 
 16  Incidentally, observe that the contrast between episodic and propositional mem-
ory is sometimes drawn by saying that this sort of belief is distinctive of episodic 
memory (Owens, 1996). 
 17  Such a view may be inspired by some remarks made by Bernecker (2010, 
pp. 235–239), who does not explicitly endorse it. 
 18  For that reason, as Audi (1995) observes, insisting on the idea that propositional 
memory judgments always trace back to memory images is to pursue an inap-
propriate analogy with perception. 
 19  I favor an approach in terms of feelings of familiarity rather than in terms of 
feelings of pastness for two reasons that I can only sketch here. First, appealing 
to feelings of pastness may be plausible in relation to episodic memory. But it is 
much less so in relation to propositional memory. One’s seeming to remember 
that Caesar was murdered is not a situation in which one feels the pastness of 
this content. Second, and as Byrne observes, “while the ‘feeling of familiarity’ is, 
well, familiar, surely the ‘feeling of pastness’ is not.” (Byrne, 2010) 
 20  This conclusion is akin to Matthen’s (2010) idea that a feeling is characteristic of 
the attitude of remembering rather than of what is remembered. It differs inso-
far as Matthen explicitly endorses this claim only as regards episodic memory, 
appealing to a “feeling of pastness” that he contrasts with a “feeling of present-
ness” that accompanies perception. 
 21  The attitude of remembering may also target perceptual contents, as when some-
thing we see feels familiar. Discussion of this issue will have to wait for another 
occasion, however. 
 22  In what follows, I am exclusively concerned with the justifi cation of these mem-
ory judgments. I am not interested in whether memory seemings can justify other 
judgments, such as the judgments  that one has been aware of the content , or  that 
it is because one was aware of the content that it is now available . For what it’s 
worth, I think that these seemings can justify these beliefs. 
 23  This is of course not to say that appealing to memory seemings is the only 
option for internalists (see Teroni, 2014). Yet, they have by and large favored 
this approach to memory justifi cation. 
 24  Lackey (2005) contends that memory can generate new justifi cation. Yet, accord-
ing to her, the situations in which memory does so are quite different from, and 
more complex than, those I discuss here, and the position she favors cannot in 
any case salvage the memory seemings account. Moreover, the sorts of situations 
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she appeals to in support of her claim may fail to support it, as Senor (2007) 
argues. See also Teroni (2014). 
 25  See Tucker (2013) for a helpful introduction to the debate. 
 26  This is a simplifi cation, as the impression may originate in a situation in which, 
although one could have judged, one did not. As far as I can see, this does not 
affect the points I want to make here. 
 27  In his discussion of phenomenal conservatism, which for present purposes can 
be understood as the claim that all seemings, memory or otherwise, confer  prima 
facie justifi cation, Tooley (2013) distinguishes basic seemings from derived seem-
ings. His distinction is meant to restrict phenomenal conservatism to seemings 
that do not depend on the subject’s prior cognitive activities, and he does so for 
reasons that are closely related to those presented here. 
 28  One may think that appealing to constraints external to the memory seeming 
goes against the spirit of internalism (Hanna, 2011). This is questionable. For 
instance, the thought that there is a close relation between justifi cation and the 
subject’s responsibility for his beliefs, which often underscores internalism, does 
not support present-tense internalism. After all, we are responsible for distant 
consequences of what we have culpably done. This is why it is surprising that 
internalists such as Huemer (2007) never introduce an aetiological condition in 
order to take on the relevant seemings. For Huemer’s own approach, which con-
sists in distinguishing justifi ed adoption and justifi ed retention, see his (1999 ). 
 29  Let me emphasize once more that I am interested in the epistemological role of 
feelings of familiarity and so, given the earlier claims, in the contribution of the 
attitude of remembering to justifi cation. I do not claim that endorsing a mem-
ory content cannot be justifi ed by something one is aware of when this content 
crosses one’s mind. I want to insist, though, that in such cases one does not judge 
because one remembers. 
 30  Hasan (2013) emphasizes the distinction between the psychological and episte-
mological roles of seemings, Bergman (2013) that between making intelligible 
and justifying. 
 31  This may lead a friend of the option under discussion to distinguish the justifi ca-
tion of propositional memory judgments, for which seemings are required, from 
the conditions under which these judgments constitute knowledge (Audi, 1995). 
This would amount to saying that, in this area at least, there can be knowledge 
without justifi cation. I do not discuss this idea here, as it is not relevant for the 
issues I wish to address. 
 32  In the same spirit, Conee (2013) writes that “absent defeaters, it is suffi cient . . . 
to believe based on the evidence that prompts the inclination.” 
 33  Given the observations in the previous paragraph, one should insist that past 
reasons justify memory judgments only if these judgments causally depend on 
them. Sam must judge that Caesar was murdered because he heard his teacher 
say so. This basing relation is a natural addition to the past reasons theory. 
The relevant causal relation takes place independently of the subject’s access to 
the past reason and more generally, of any psychological process taking place 
at the time of memory. 
 34  For sophisticated versions of this theory, see Naylor (1971, 1982) and Bernecker 
(2010). 
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